Observing that people often use categorization to simplify choice problems and follow some search order to make a choice, we develop and axiomatize a stochastic choice model in which the decision maker first categorizes alternatives in a menu into disjoint categories, then search over categories sequentially until making a choice. JEL Classification: D01, D81
Introduction
People often use categorization to simplify complex choice problems. For example, in supermarkets or restaurants products or foods are exogenously categorized so that customers can quickly locate the products or foods they want to purchase. When searching for hotels through online-booking websites, people often first categorize hotels according to some criterion such as distance, price or rating before making a choice. Through a combination of field and laboratory experiments Mogilner et al. (2008) find that the presence of categories positively influences the satisfaction of choosers who are unfamiliar with the choice domain. In the situations that alternatives are not exogenously categorized, people may subjectively categorize alternatives in their minds which cannot be directly observed by the others. When people face a menu containing a lot of alternatives, they are almost impossible to pay attention to each alternative carefully. The benefit of categorization is that it lets people reasonably organize their attention: people can first abstractly consider categories without knowing their exact contents, then consider a specific category carefully if they want to make a choice from it.
Another feature in people's choice behavior is that people often consider alternatives sequentially instead of simultaneously, even though alternatives are exogenously categorized. It is either because alternatives are physically ordered when they are presented to people, or because they come to people's mind in some sequential manner. For example, in supermarkets people often look at shelves (categories in the context) sequentially, while in restaurants people often first look at the category titles (e.g., appetizer, beef, chicken and seafood) in menus one by one. In the literature Simon (1955) has introduced the satisficing model to capture the search behavior of people, while Rubinstein and Salant (2006) , among others, has axiomatized the order effect of alternatives on people's choices.
A consistent finding regarding people's choice behavior in field and laboratory experiments is stochasticity. Hence in this paper we propose and axiomatize a stochastic choice model which incorporates the above two features of people's choice behavior: categorization and sequential search. The model is an adaption of the well-known Luce model (Luce, 1959) to the existence of categories and sequential search, hence we call it sequential Luce with categorization (SLC). Specifically, in the model all alternatives are categorized into disjoint categories. Accordingly, every nonempty menu contains one or multiple categories of alternatives. Facing a menu, the decision maker (DM) considers the categories in the menu sequentially according to a menu-independent order. Once DM considers a category, his choice from the category follows the Luce model with the exception that he may randomly fail to make a choice. In the former case he stops his search; in the latter case he considers the next category and so on. If DM fails to make a choice from all categories in the menu, we say he chooses the "no choice" option. In the paper we identify the categories and the search order endogenously from the dataset.
We do not explain why DM may fail to make a choice from a considered category. In practice it can be because the alternatives in the same category have similar attributes such that DM has a difficulty to make a choice.
When all alternatives belong to one category, SLC obviously degenerates to the Luce model with "no choice" option. In general cases the choice probability ratio of any two alternatives in the same category satisfies Luce's Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) axiom. However, the existence of categories and the sequential search feature make SLC different from the Luce model in that, in SLC the choice of DM from any category in a menu is not affected by the other categories in the menu that DM has not considered, and the choice probability ratio of any two alternatives from the same category in a menu is not affected by all the other categories in the menu. Indeed, in our characterization we use the first different to identify the categories and search order of SLC, and formalize the second difference as an axiom, along with other simple axioms, to characterize SLC.
On the other hand, when each alternative forms a singleton category, it is interesting that SLC degenerates to the random consideration set rule (RCSR) of Manzini and Mariotti (2014) . Hence SLC can also be seen as an extension of RCSR to the existence of categories.
1 However, a limited attention interpretation of SLC may not be appropriate in the presence of categories, especially when categories are subjective. We have more discussion about it in the paper. As a corollary of our axiomatization we provide a new characterization of RCSR. It is simple and straightforward compared with the original characterization by Manzini and Mariotti and a new one by Brady and Rehbeck (2016) .
We show that SLC is flexible to accommodate multiple behavioral anomalies. In particular, although both the Luce model and RCSR belong to random utility models, SLC does not. So it can explain the phenomenon of violating regularity. Both the Luce model and RCSR also imply that the random choice of DM has full support, that is, DM chooses each alternative from each nonempty menu is positive. However, SLC can accommodate 1 It is also interesting to compare SLC with the attribute rule of Gul et al. (2014) . In the attribute rule DM first randomly pays attention to an attribute, then randomly chooses an alternative that has the attribute. DM's choice at both stages follows the Luce model. If we interpret each attribute as a category, then the difference between the attribute rule and SLC is that in the attribute rule categories need not be disjoint and it is as if that DM considers all categories simultaneously, while in SLC DM considers categories sequentially.
the situation that DM chooses an alternative from a menu with zero probability, but chooses the same alternative from another menu with a positive probability.
In practice and many lab experiments a default "no choice" option is often not available. Hence we also propose and axiomatize a variant of SLC by excluding the default. In the variant model we assume whenever DM considers the last category in a menu, he will definitely make a choice from the category.
2 This contrasts SLC with multiple stochastic choice models in the literature in which the existence of a default option is crucial for their identification. We compare SLC with multiple existing models in the paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we define the random choice datasets we study. In Section 3 we define SLC and discuss its special cases. In Section 4 we identify and axiomatize SLC. In Section 5 we apply SLC to explain multiple behavioral anomalies. In Section 6 we compare SLC to other stochastic choice models in the literature. In Section 7 we define and axiomatize the variant of SLC without default.
In Section 8 we discuss other related literature. All proofs are in Appendix.
Random Choice Dataset
There are a finite set X of alternatives containing at least three elements, and a domain D of subsets of X. Each element of D is a menu from which DM needs to make a choice.
D may not contain every subset of X, but it satisfies the following "richness" assumption:
{a, b, c} ∈ D for all distinct a, b, c ∈ X and for any A, B ⊆ X, if A ⊆ B and B ∈ D then A ∈ D. If DM does not choose any alternative from a menu, we say he chooses the "no choice" option a * (default alternative). Denote X * ≡ X ∪ {a * } and A * ≡ A ∪ {a * } for all A ∈ D. A random choice dataset is defined as a random choice rule as follows.
p(a * , A) = 1 if and only if A = ∅.
Here p(a, A) is the probability that DM chooses a ∈ A * from A. to choose some alternative in A with zero probability; but we require that DM choose some alternative in A with a positive probability since p(a * , A) = 1 only if A = ∅. For all A ∈ D\∅ and all B ⊆ A * , we denote by p(B, A) ≡ a∈B p(a, A) the probability that some alternative in B is chosen from A.
The Model
In our model all alternatives in X are categorized into disjoint categories. We keep agnostic about whether this categorization is objective or subjective. To denote it we introduce a transitive categorization relation ∼ such that for any a, b ∈ X, a and b belong to the same category if and only if a ∼ b. So all categories form a partition of X, denoted byX ≡ {X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X k X }. The categorization relation also defines the categories in each nonempty menu A, which are similarly denoted byÃ ≡ {A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A k A }. In our model DM considers the categories in each nonempty menu sequentially following a menuindependent order. We denote the order by and call it search order. Without loss of generality we assume that X i X i+1 for all 1 ≤ i < k X and A i A i+1 for all A ∈ D\{∅} and all 1 ≤ i < k A . For all A ∈ D\{∅} and all a ∈ A, we denote by A a the category in A that contains a. For convenience we define a binary relation to subsume both and ∼: for all a, b ∈ X and all A ∈ D, we say a b if X a X b , a b if a ∼ b or a b, and A b if a b for all a ∈ A. By this definition is a weak order on X.
Facing a nonempty menu A, DM considers the categories in A sequentially according to the search order . So DM first considers A 1 and tries to make a choice from it.
DM chooses each a ∈ A 1 with a probability of γ(a,
, which is a Luce-type formula. Here u(a) reflects the desirability (attractiveness) of a relative to the other alternatives in A 1 . We denote by π(A 1 ) the probability that some alternative in A 1 is chosen. However, DM may choose nothing from A 1 , the probability of which is
. Note that u(A 1 ) is not the measure of the desirability of 
In the above definition we require that u(a) > 0 for all a ∈ X. This implies that once DM considers a category in a menu, DM chooses each alternative in the category with a positive probability. However we only require that u(A i ) ≥ 0 for all A i ∈Ã. So if u(A i ) = 0 for some A i , then once DM considers A i , he will make a choice from A i for sure and not consider any category A j such that j > i. This implies that some alternative can be chosen with zero probability in some menu. It can also happen that some alternative is chosen with zero probability in some menu but with a positive probability in another menu.
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Special Cases of SLC: Manzini and Mariotti (2014) propose RCSR by assuming that DM has standard preferences but pays attention to alternatives randomly and independently. It is interesting to note that RCSR is a special case of SLC. In particular, if each category contains only one alternative in SLC, then the representation of SLC degenerates to the representation of RCSR:
where
is the probability that DM pays attention to each a ∈ X. Manzini and Mariotti (MM hereafter) focus on random choice datasets with full support, that is, p ,γ (a, A) ∈ (0, 1). We can achieve this by requiring that u({a}) > 0 for all a ∈ X.
It is obvious that SLC subsumes the Luce model (with a default) as a special case when all alternatives belong to the same category.
In this section we characterize SLC using three axioms. We first show how to identify DM's categorization relation and search order from a random choice dataset p. Since the search order is menu-independent, any lower-ranked category in the search order does not affect DM's random choice from any higher-ranked category. We use this feature to identify . In particular, if removing an alternative b has no impact on the choice probability of an alternative a from every menu containing them, then we conclude that a must be in a higher-ranked category than b, that is, a b. Otherwise, b a.
When a * b and b * a, we say a ∼ * b. Then * is the revealed search order and ∼ * is the revealed categorization relation. When a * b, we also say a * b.
It is easy to see that * is complete since either case (1) or case (2) of Revealed relation must happen. However * may not be transitive. So our first axiom Transitivity requires that * be transitive.
Transitivity: If there are a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ∈ X such that a 1 R 1 a 2 · · · a n R n a 1 where
In SLC we assume that u(a) > 0 for all a ∈ X, so once DM considers a category, he must choose every alternative in the category with a positive probability. This implies that DM's random choice from any menu consisting of a single category has full support.
We formalize it as our second axiom.
Our last axiom is an adaption of Luce's IIA and it includes two parts. SLC assumes that DM follows a Luce-type formula to make a choice from a category, so the odd ratio of any two alternatives in the same category must satisfy Luce's IIA. We formalize this feature as the first part of the axiom. Moreover, in SLC whenever DM considers the last category in a menu, his choice is not affected by the alternatives in higher-ranked categories in the menu since he has missed them. So in the second part we require that the odd ratio of the default and any alternative in the last category of a menu does not change if we remove any alternatives in higher-ranked categories of the menu.
I-IIA:
for all B ⊆ A ∈ D such that a ∈ A * a, B * a, and p(a, A)p(a, A\B) > 0.
Theorem 1 below will prove that a random choice dataset that satisfies Transitivity, Single-category Full Support and I-IIA must be a SLC. However, the converse is not true because a SLC may not satisfy Transitivity. We show it through the following example.
* a and a * b. So SLC does not satisfy Transitivity.
In the above example, we deliberately choose the function u such that removing either a or b has no impact on the choice probability of the other in every menu. So although a ∼ b, we do not identify their relation correctly. However, if the function u is perturbed a little bit, we can identify their relation correctly. In general as long as there is one menu in which removing a has an impact on the choice probability of b and there is one menu in which removing b has an impact on the choice probability of a, then we can identify that a ∼ * b. Since u satisfies this property generically, we call SLC that have this property generic and denote them by gSLC. Moreover, is unique and u is unique up to category-wise positive multiplication.
That is, for any generic p ,u such that p ,u = p ,u , we know that = and there exists some
The proof of the theorem can be found in Appendix A. The necessity part is obvious, while the main idea behind the sufficiency part is also simple. Since the random choice rule p satisfies Transitivity, the revealed relation * is a weak order. So the categories in any nonempty menu A is well-defined and we denote them by
. By Single-category Full Support and I-IIA(1), there exists a positive function u defined on X such that for all a ∼ * b,
where the third equality follows I-IIA. Hence,
If u(A 1 ) = 0, then p(A 1 , A)=1 and p(a, A) = 0 for all a ∈ A 2 . So equation (6) still holds. Repeating the above procedure for all A i we can prove the sufficiency part.
Characterization of RCSR
Theorem 1 implies a new characterization of RCSR. In particular, since SLC degenerates to RCSR when each category contains only one alternative, we need an axiom to rule out a ∼ * b for any a, b. So we strengthen Transitivity to Acyclicity which requires that * be acyclic.
Acyclicity: There do not exist a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ∈ X such that a 1 R 1 a 2 · · · a n R n a 1 where
Single-category Full Support is automatically satisfied since p(a * 
Recall that γ(a) ≡ u(a) u(a)+u({a})
. Since u is unique up to category-wise positive multiplication, γ is unique.
MM assume that the random choice dataset has full support and use the following two axioms to characterize RCSR. I-Asymmetry:
and
.
There are several differences between MM's characterization and Corollary 1.
That is, removing a from some menu has a positive impact on the choice probability of b from the menu. This definition itself does not guarantee that * is complete. By contrast, we identify a * b if removing b has no impact on the choice probability of a in all menus; otherwise we identify b * a. By our definition * is always complete.
Second, we use different axioms. MM need to use I-Asymmetry and I-Independence together to prove that * is complete, transitive and asymmetric, and the random choice rule p is a RCSR. By contrast, our axioms play straightforward roles in Corollary 1:
Acyclicity implies that * is transitive and asymmetric, while I-IIA(2) implies that the random choice rule p is a RCSR. If we assume that the random choice dataset has full support as MM do, we can rewrite I-IIA(2) as
for all a ∈ A * a and b * a.
Then the difference between I-IIA(2) and MM's I-Independence is that I-Independence requires that the ratios of
be independent of the menu A, while I-IIA(2) requires that
hold conditionally for some a, b in any menu A.
MM show that RCSR satisfies another property called I-Neutrality 5 , which states that if c * a and c
. In our model we can treat a * as belonging to the worst category in all menus, then it is easy to see that I-IIA (2) is weaker than I-Neutrality.
In an earlier version of their paper (Manzini and Mariotti, 2011 ) MM provide another characterization of RCSR using three axioms: Acyclicity, Regularity and Stochastic binariness. 6 Acyclicity plays the same role in their result as in ours. But since we use different identification methods from theirs, our characterization is still independent of theirs. Brady and Rehbeck (2016) provide another characterization of RCSR. We discuss it in Section 6.1.
Application

Violations of Regularity: Choice Overload and Attraction
Effect MM have shown that RCSR can explain choice frequency reversals and violations of stochastic transitivity. Since RCSR is a special case of SLC, SLC can also explain these phenomena. RCSR is a random utility model and all random utility models must satisfy regularity, which says the choice probability of any alternative in a menu cannot increase 5 I-Neutrality:
Stochastic binariness: for all A ∈ D and {a, b} ⊆ A, if p(a, A\{b}) > p(a, A) then
if new alternatives are added to the menu. SLC can violate regularity, so it is not a random utility model. Specifically, in p ,u if we add a new alternative a to a menu A, it will not affect the choice probability of any alternative b ∈ A if b a. Suppose u(A j ) > 0 for all A j ∈Ã such that A j a. Then if there does not exist b ∈ A such that a ∼ b, then adding a to A will create a new category {a} in A ∪ {a} such that all b ≺ a will be chosen with smaller probabilities than before. If there exists b ∈ A such that a ∼ b, then let A i ∈Ã be the category such that A i ∼ a. Although adding a to A will increase the size of the
is sufficiently bigger than u(A i ), the choice probability of all b ≺ a can weakly increase and some can strictly increase. Indeed, it is easy to check that
is sufficiently smaller than u(A i ), the choice probability of all b ∈ A i can increase. Indeed,
A well-known violation of regularity is choice overload : when DM faces more alternatives, DM fails to make a choice more often. It is confirmed in multiple field experiments.
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A common feature in these experiments is that DM faces menus consisting of similar alternatives. So we can summarize choice overload as:
and a ∼ A. As discussed above, SLC can exhibit choice overload.
Another well-known violation of regularity is the attraction effect (Simonson and Tversky, 1992) . Suppose there are three alternatives {a, b, c} such that b clearly dominates c but a does not dominate c, then the attraction effect says that adding c to the menu {a, b} will increase the choice probability of b, that is, p(b, {a, b, c}) > p(b, {a, b}). Since b and c are more comparable, if we treat {b, c} as a category and treat {a} as another category, then SLC can exhibit the attraction effect.
7 Iyengar and Lepper (2000) set a tasting booth at a local grocery store that offers two menus to consumers: one menu consisting of 6 flavors of jam and the other consisting of 24 flavors. They find that 30% of consumers make a choice facing the first menu but only 3% make a choice facing the second menu. Follow-up experiments have similar findings by using chocolates (Chernev, 2003) and pens (Shah and Wolford, 2007) .
Violations of IIA: Duplicates Problem, Similarity Effect and Compromise Effect
The most famous critique on Luce's IIA is probably the "duplicate problem" pointed out by Debreu (1960) . It says that if duplicates of an alternative in a menu are added to the menu, it should not change the choice probabilities of other alternatives in the menu. The
Luce model violates this property. SLC can satisfy this property if we treat the duplicates of an alternative as a category and choose the function u properly such that a category is always chosen with a constant probability. That is,
is a constant for all
Similarity effect and compromise effect are two other well-known violations of Luce's IIA. Similarity effect says that if there are three alternatives {a, b, c} such that c is similar to a but distinct from b, then adding c to the menu {a, b} will reduce the odd ratio of a
Compromise effect says that if there are three alternatives {a, b, c} such that a, c are extreme in some attributes while b is moderate, then adding c to the menu {a, b} will make b being chosen more often than a, in contrast to that a is chosen more often than
Since a, c are similar in the similarity effect and are extreme in the comprise effect, if we treat {a, c} as a category and treat {b} as another category, then SLC can explain both effects. The details are in Appendix B.
Comparison with Related Stochastic Choice Models
Models with Stochastic Consideration Set
We have shown that SLC subsumes RCSR as a special case. We may interpret SLC also as a model with stochastic consideration set. Specifically, the search order is DM's preference relation over categories. Facing a menu A, DM first pays attention to each category A i randomly and independently with probability π(A i ). Then DM chooses an alternative from the best category in his consideration set following the Luce model. Hence he is impossible to subjectively categorize all alternatives in a menu but at the same time ignores the existence of some alternatives. Lastly, no matter categories are objective or subjective, the purpose of categorization is to simplify choice problems. So it is probable that the number of categories is small enough such that DM is able to pay attention to all categories.
In the following we compare SLC with other models with stochastic consideration set in the literature. Brady and Rehbeck (2016) (BR hereafter) propose the random conditional choice set rule (RCCSR) p ,π . Here is DM's strict preference relation over all alternatives. Facing a menu DM first randomly pays attention to a subset of the menu, then chooses the best alternative in the subset. BR assume that DM's attention paid to all possible menus follows a global probability distribution π : D → (0, 1), and DM pays attention to a subset B of a menu A with a probability of
. The representation of RCCSR is as follows.
where A a ≡ {B ⊆ A : a = arg max B}.
SLC and RCCSR do not nest each other. To prove it we first show that RCCSR does not satisfy I-IIA through the following example.
Suppose there is a RCCSR p ,π such that a b c, π({a}) = π({b}) = π({c}) = .1, π({a, b}) = π({b, c}) = π({a, c}) = .1, and π({a, b, c}) = π(∅) = .2. It is easy to check that p ,π (a, {a}) = 1/3 and p ,π (a, {a, b}) = p ,π (a, {a, c}) = 2/5. Aguiar (2015) proposes a fuzzy attention model (FAM) p ,ϕ which also generalizes RCSR. Specifically, is DM's strict preference relation over all alternatives, and ϕ : In FAM DM can pay complex attention, such as substitutable attention and complementary attention, to alternatives. However, this also increases the difficulty of identifying FAM. FAM satisfies default monotonicity, so it does not nest SLC. On the other hand, SLC neither nests FAM. Kovach (2016) extends RCSR by assuming that there exists an observable status quo in each menu such that DM pays attention to it for sure, and DM randomly pays attention to other alternatives only if they are sufficiently better than the status quo. He uses different datasets than ours, and his model and SLC do not nest each other. ASI: For all distinct a, b ∈ X, either aI {a,b} b or bI {a,b} a.
TSI: For all distinct a, b, c ∈ X, aI {a,b} b and bI {b,c} c imply aI {a,c} c.
ESI: For all a ∈ X and all A, B ∈ D such that a ∈ A ∩ B, ∀b ∈ A\{a}, bI A a and ∀c ∈ B\{a}, cI B a imply that ∀d ∈ A ∪ B\{a}, dI A∪B a.
MIDO: For all a ∈ X and all A, B ∈ D such that a ∈ A ∩ B,
Note that MIDO is a part of MM's I-Independence axiom.
Variants of Luce Model
We have shown that SLC subsumes the Luce model as a special case. Now we compare SLC with some variants of the Luce model in the literature. Gul et al. (2014) (GNP hereafter) propose the attribute rule in which each alternative is characterized by a set of endogenous attributes and DM follows a two-stage procedure to make a choice: DM first randomly chooses an attribute, then randomly chooses an alternative that has the attribute. At the first stage each attribute has a weight such that DM's choice follows a Luce-type formula; at the second stage each alternative has an intensity of the chosen attribute such that DM's choice also follows a Luce-type formula.
The representation of the attribute rule is as follows.
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In the attribute rule if we interpret each attribute as a category, then each alternative can belong to multiple categories. Then SLC is different from the attribute rule in that in SLC DM considers categories sequentially, while in the attribute rule there is no such sequential order. The attribute rule is a random utility model, so it does not nest SLC.
Through the following example we show that SLC neither nests the attribute rule. , which means that p v,w,η violates I-IIA. So p v,w,η is not a SLC.
9 v a is the set of attributes of a, v(A) ≡ ∪ a∈A v a is the set of all attributes in A, w x is the weight of attribute x, η x a is the intensity of attribute x at a, and η x (A) ≡ a∈A η x a is the total intensity of attribute x in A.
(PALM) pˆ ,û in which DM follows a weak perception orderˆ to consider the alternatives in a menu, and once an alternative is considered, it is chosen with a probability same as in the Luce model.
EST (2014): pˆ ,û (a, A) = µ(a, A) Aα∈Ã:Aαˆ a (1 − b∈Aα µ(b, A) ) whereˆ is a weak order on X,û : X ∪ D → R ++ is a function, and µ(a, A) =û
The representation of PALM looks similar to that of SLC, but they have a crucial difference: in PALM once an alternative is perceived, its choice probability depends on all alternatives in the menu (µ(a, A) =û (Aa) ).
PALM and SLC do not nest each other. In particular, in SLC the default a * can be chosen with zero probability in some menu, while in PALM a * is always chosen with a positive probability. In the following example we show that SLC does not nest PALM. Suppose pˆ ,û is a SLC. Since removing any alternative from {a, b, c} will change the choice probabilities of the other two alternatives, a, b, c must be in the same category.
However,
, which means that pˆ ,û violates I-IIA. So pˆ ,û is not a SLC. Aguiar et al. (2015) propose the general satisficing model ( SLC is different from GSM in that the search order in SLC is deterministic but DM randomly stops his search. SLC and FSSM do not nest each other. In particular, in FSSM it cannot happen that an alternative is chosen with zero probability in a menu but is chosen with a positive probability in another menu. However it can happen in SLC.
Models with Random Search
In the following example we show that SLC does not nest FSSM.
Suppose there is a FSSM p in which all alternatives pass the satisficing level. The distribution of search order in all menus is as follows. 1 Suppose p is a SLC. Since removing any alternative from {a, b, c} will change the choice probabilities of the other two alternatives, a, b, c must be in the same category.
, which means that p violates I-IIA. So p is not a SLC.
Ravid (2015) proposes another random search model called focus, then compare (FTC).
In FTC, DM first randomly draws an alternative from a menu as a focal option, then compares the focal option sequentially with other alternatives in the menu. The winner of every binary comparison is random. The focal option is chosen if it wins in all binary comparisons. Otherwise DM randomly draws another focal option with replacement and makes the sequential comparisons again. There is no default alternative a * .
The representation of FTC is as follows.
Ravid (2015):
where π(a, b) > 0 is the probability that a wins in the comparison between a and b when a is focal.
FTC does not nest SLC because it can only explain datasets with full support. SLC neither nests FTC, which can be seen through the following example. Suppose p π is a SLC. Since removing any alternative from {a, b, c} will change the choice probabilities of the other two alternatives, a, b, c must be in the same category.
, which means that p π violates I-IIA. So p π is not a SLC. Fudenberg et al. (2015a) and Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2015) both propose models to explain why DM may deliberately randomize his choice. In particular, Fudenberg et al. assume that DM optimally chooses an lottery over a menu to maximize an expected utility function perturbed by a cost function. In the setup of Cerreia-Vioglio et al. each alternative is a lottery such that choosing a lottery over a menu is equivalent to choosing a compound lottery. If DM has a preference relation over compound lotteries, he will deliberately choose the most preferred compound lottery.
Models with Deliberately Stochastic Choice
SLC is different from these two models in that SLC does not rationalize DM's stochastic choice. SLC belongs to the class of models with bounded rationality.
A Variant of SLC without Default Option
In previous sections we assume that there is a default alternative such that whenever DM does not make a choice from a menu, he chooses the default. However, in many lab experiments there does not exist such a option (e.g., Agranov and Ortoleva, 2015) . In this section we propose a variant of SLC by excluding the existence of a * .
SLC Without Default
In SLC we assume that DM chooses a * if he misses all categories in a menu. Since a * is not available now we assume that whenever DM considers the last category in a menu and is going to miss it, he will reconsider the last category and force himself to make a choice. This leads to the following representation. To differentiate it from SLC we call it SLC-D and denote it byp ,u .
Definition 5. A sequential Luce with categorization but without default (SLC-D)
is a random choice rulep ,u for which is a weak order on X, u is a function defined on
, otherwise, and X k X , A k A are the last categories in X and A respectively.
guarantees that DM always makes a choice from each menu.
Characterization of SLC-D
In this subsection we provide a characterization of SLC-D. Since a * is not available, for the random choice rule p considered in this subsection we have p(a * , A) = 0 for all A ∈ D\{∅}.
Because of the "discontinuity" in the definition of γ(a, A), the identification method we use to characterize SLC does not work here. It is because in SLC-D removing the last category A k A from a menu A may change the choice probabilities of alternatives in
For example, suppose a b andp ,u (a, {a, b}) < 1. Then we havep ,u (a, {a, b}\{b}) = 1 >p ,u (a, {a, b}). If using our previous method we would identify that b * a.
However, if there exists c ∼ b, then a b implies thatp ,u (a, A\{b}) =p ,u (a, A) for all {a, b, c} ⊆ A since a does not belong to the last category in both A and A\{b}. In the following we will use this fact to identify . But to do it we first need to identify ∼. Using the similar idea behind the definition of gSLC, we will use the evidence that removing each of a, b changes the choice probability of the other in each menu containing them to identify a ∼ b. Moreover, if we identify that a ∼ b ∼ c, then we also know that a ∼ c.
Let ∼ * be the transitive closure of
(2) a 2 b if (i) there exist {a, b} ⊆ A ∈ D and some c ∈ A\{a, b} such that b ∼ * c, and (ii) p(a, A) = p(a, A\{b}) for all A satisfying (i).
Let * be the transitive closure of ∼ 1 and 2 :
If R i = 2 for some i, we say a * b. Without any assumption * may be incomplete and intransitive. Our first axiom requires * be a weak order.
Weak Order: * is a weak order.
Our second axiom is similar with but stronger than Single-category Full Support. It says that if DM chooses a subset of alternatives in a menu with a positive probability, then DM must choose each alternative in the highest-ranked category in the subset with a positive probability. This axiom is equivalent to Single-category Full Support in the presence of other axioms in Section 4.
Highest-cateogry Full Support: For all A ∈ D\{∅} and all nonempty B ⊆ A, if
Our third axiom is also an adaption of I-IIA. Its first part is same with I-IIA(1). Since a * is not available now, its second part is different from I-IIA(2): we require that removing any alternatives in higher-ranked categories have no impact on the odd ratio of any two alternatives in lower-ranked categories. SLC-D satisfies this because the categories DM has missed from a menu do not affect DM's choice from the remaining categories.
I-IIA-D:
(
for all A, B ∈ D such that {a, b} ⊆ A ∩ B and p(b, A)p(b, B) > 0.
for all B ⊆ A ∈ D such that {a, b} ⊆ A, B * {a, b}, and p(b, A)p(b, A\B) > 0.
We need one more axiom called L-Independence (lower-independence). It says that if a menu A is a strict subset of both menu B and menu C and each alternative in A belongs to a higher-ranked category than the remaining alternatives in B and C, then each alternative in A should be chosen with the same probability in both B and C. SLC-D satisfies this axiom since in both B and C DM considers the alternatives in A before considering other alternatives. So his random choice from A must coincide in both menus.
We do not need this axiom to characterize SLC since it is implied by the identification method in Section 4.
Before stating the characterization theorem we first define two properties of SLC-D.
For anyp ,u and any a, b ∈ X such that a ∼ b, we say a and b have mutual impact, denoted by a ∧ b, if removing each of them has an impact on the choice probability of the other in every menu containing them. That is,p ,u (a, A) =p ,u (a, A\{b}) and
Then we sayp ,u is strongly generic 12 if any two same-category alternatives either have mutual impact, or they can be connected through a sequence of alternatives in which every alternative has mutual impact with its neighbors.
Definition 7. A SLC-Dp ,u is strongly generic if for all a, b ∈ X such that a ∼ b,
In Revealed relation-D we identify a b only if there exists another c such that b ∼ c.
That is, b cannot belong to a singleton category. So we say ap ,u is rich if every category in X other than X 1 contains at least two alternatives.
Now we are ready to present the characterization theorem. Moreover, is unique and u is unique up to category-wise positive multiplication.
Related Literature
In the choice-theoretical literature several papers have studied the existence of categories.
Barbos ( 
A Proofs of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2
Proof of Theorem 1
• (Sufficiency) Suppose a random choice rule p satisfies Transitivity, Single-category
Full Support and I-IIA, we prove that it is a gSLC.
First, Transitivity implies that the revealed relation * is a weak order. So ∼ * can induce a partition of X, denoted by {X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X k X }.
For all X i and all nonempty A i ⊆ X i , define
By Single-category Full Support
13 To be precise, they assume that each alternative a is an lottery and the primitive p * is a compound lottery for each menu A such that p
So q satisfies Luce's IIA on X i . Since
. Then,
Now we prove the sufficiency part by induction. For any nonempty menu A ∈ D and its categories {A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A k A }, consider any a ∈ A 1 . It is obvious that p(a, A) = p(a, A 1 ). Otherwise there exist b ∈ A i for some i > 1 and some A 1 ⊆ A ⊆ A such that p(a, A ) = p(a, A \{b}). However, this implies that b * a which contradicts a * b.
Hence,
Suppose the theorem holds for all A k such that k < i, then it implies that
Now we prove that the theorem also holds for A i .
So the fractions appearing in the following equations are well-defined.
For all a ∈ A i , we have
The fourth equality follows I-IIA(1) and I-IIA(2). Hence,
If u(A k ) = 0 for some k < i, then by the induction assumption j≤k p(A j , A) = 1.
So p(A i , A) = 0. Then equation (10) is still correct since π(A k ) = 1. So by induction
Now we prove that p * ,u is generic. Suppose the contrary, then for some a ∼ * b, we
This implies that either
• (Necessity) To prove that a generic p ,u satisfies the axioms, we first prove that = * . That is, the weak order can be perfectly identified. This implies that p ,u satisfies Transitivity.
If a b, then it is obvious that p ,u (a, A) = p ,u (a, A\{b}) for all A ∈ D. By Revealed
Revealed relation a * b and b * a. So a ∼ * b. This implies that = * .
Since u(a) > 0 for all a ∈ X, p ,u must satisfy Single-category Full Support. It is obvious that p ,u satisfies I-IIA.
• (Uniqueness) For any generic p ,u such that p ,u = p ,u , since = * = , is unique. Then the set of categories is also unique. By Luce (1959) , there exists some
A ∈ D\{∅} such that A ⊆ X i . So u is unique up to category-wise positive multiplication.
Proof of Theorem 2
• ( .
We prove the sufficiency part by induction. For any A ∈ A\{∅}, if A 2 = ∅, then for
If If A i+1 = ∅, we define
We prove that u(A i , A) is independent of A. • (Necessity) For a rich and strongly genericp , u , we prove that the revealed relation * is a weak order. To prove it we prove that * = .
Sincep , u is rich, for all a ∈ X i such that i > 1 there exists b ∈ X i such that It is easy to check thatp , u satisfies Highest-category Full Support, I-IIA-D and L-Independence.
• (Uniqueness) Since we already prove that = * , is unique. For the same reason in Theorem 1, u is unique up to category-wise positive multiplication. .
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